# Discourse Analysis, Semantic Scripts,

# Verbal Humor

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I would like to begin this essay with a quotation:

"Nothing is laughable in itself: the laughable borrows its special quality from some persons or group of persons who happen to laugh at, it, and, unless you happen also to know a good deal about this person or group of persons you cannot by any means guarantee the laugh beforehand. It is only people with the same social heritage who laugh easily at the same kind of jokes. That is why laughter so often balks at national frontiers, and dies away with the passage of time." (Raskin (1985) pg.17)

What language teacher can count the number of times they have tried to relieve a potentially stressful classroom situation with a verbal joke only to find the joke fall flat? In some cases the joke perhaps involved language beyond the competence of the audience but in fact, in most cases, I would argue, the joke was not recognized as a joke because the teacher and the audience did not share the same world knowledge, and although verbal humor is universal, the discoursal markers that signal

an act of humor are not. Victor Raskin, in his, book <u>Semantic Mechanisms of Humor</u> the main source of inspiration for the thoughts behind this essay has one of those typical frightfully mathematical—looking linguistic formulas which he uses to define what he means by humor (I will write out his symbols in full words). Raskin writes that a <u>verbaljoke</u> is likely to be formulated as:

VERBAL JOKE (SPEAKER, HEARER, TEXT, EXPERIENCE of speaker, EXPERIENCE of hearer, EXPERIENCE of speaker and hearer, PSYCHOLOGY of speaker, PSYCHOLOGY of hearer, (physical environment or) SITUATION, SOCIETY of speaker and hearer) = X, where X=FUNNY, or X=UNFUNNY. And (in Austin's terms) a joke will be successful (felicitous), when X=FUNNY.

Perhaps the FL classroom was not considered by the audience to be the correct SITUATION for humor so the teacher's joke was taken at face value — as bona—ide communication, which of course is the death of verbal humor. Perhaps the teacher did not signal his intention to joke — or the audience did not recognize the signals — and only at the conclusion of the joke, when the teacher may have chuckled or laughed, did the audience realize that perhaps a joke had been intended and in order to stave off a potentially embarrassing situation, compensated by over — reacting with hollow — sounding, unsuitably prolonged laughter. Verbal jokes belong to a recognizable genre — as Swales (1990) defines genre — a classifying category, an ideal type, a type of communicative event — and as Swales writes, the primary emphasis in genre member-

ship is on the shared purpose of the event rather than on similarities of form (the shared purpose being, the laughter of the audience). As an ideal type, the genre of jokes may by universal – but what is funny, what one laughs at, is not.


As Nash (1985), in his interesting <u>The Language of Humor</u> writes, an act of humor has three 'principle references' (pg. 9-10):

- 1) a <u>genus</u> (the <u>generic</u>), or derivation in culture, institutions, attitudes, beliefs, typical practices, characteristic artefacts.
- 2) a characteristic design presentation, or verbal packaging whereby one recognizes the intention to joke and
- 3) a <u>locus</u> (the <u>locative</u>) in language, some word or phrase that is indispensable to the joke the point at which humor exists and is transmitted.

Needless to say, <u>generic reference</u> is very broad – social, historical facts, customs, traditions, prejudices, stereotypes – from this very large grouping of world knowledge we draw our ideas of what is funny.

Raskin's theory of humor involves what he calls <u>scripts</u> – which in fact are elsewhere called <u>frames</u>, <u>schemata</u>, <u>scenarios</u>, <u>mental maps</u>, <u>daemon</u>, etc. He defines scripts as large chunks of semantic information surrounding words or evoked by them – scripts are a cognitive structure, internalized by a native speaker (NS) (Raskin does not raise the question of non – NS scripts) and represent a NS's knowledge of a small part of the world. Every NS has internalized a large 'repertoire of scripts' of common–sense knowledge of routines, standardized procedures, basic situations, etc. Every NS also has individual scripts deter-

mined by individual background and experience. On top of this, every NS has restricted scripts that are shared with a certain group but not with the whole speech community of the NS. Raskin diagrams his basic premise concerning scripts in this way:



Raskin's general theory of semantics and his theory of the semantics of humor are much too detailed to deal with here. In general, though, Raskin feels that jokes are the perfect symbols of schemata in discourse. He also relates jokes to Grice's <u>implicature</u> in that the author of a joke uses a sentence, purposefully in verbal humor, not in its literal meaning. Raskin also posits what he calls the <u>speech act of making a joke</u>:

'proposition content' : A proposition (p) or set of propsitions (P) ; 'preparatory condition' : 1) S considers (p) or (P) appropriate to the situation ; 2) S is not committed to the literal truth of (p) or (P) ;

'sincerity condition': S considers (p) or (P) Funny;

'essential condition': Counts as an attempt to make H laugh.

These conditions are all "post – hoc" and only partly necessary conditions for a text to be funny (pg.56).

Essentially, Raskin's semantic theory is that every sentence is understood within some context – if context is not given by the surrounding discourse explicity or by the extralinguistic situation, H will supply context from previous experience and if H is unable to do this, incomprehension results. Jokes usually involve some kind of ambiguous situation, and when S utters an ambiguous sentence, with the intention of being ambiguous, H has the potential problem of matching H's obvious contexy (pg.64) with either S's obvious context or its opposite. Which of the two contexts of S become obvious to H depends on all the elements listed in Raskin's formula for verbal jokes. These elements also invoke what Raskin terms extralexical information - semantic properties brought to the surface by words which are not usually fitted into dictionary definitions but which are essential for comprehending most ordinary sentences. Under extralexical information Raskin includes presupposition, semantic recursion (see Raskin pg.71-74), conversational postulates (of Gordon and Lakoff), (Grice's) implicatures, (Searle's) implicatures, (Searle's) indirect speech acts, inference rules, entailments, conjectures, cliches, and allusions. Raskin's format for a semantic theory incorporating extralexical information has:

1) the  $\underline{lexicon}$  - which contains lexical information that approximates S/H knowledge of the meaning of words and ;

2) <u>combinatorial rules</u> which: a) combine the meaning of words into a semantic interpretation of the whole sentence to which the words belong and b) approximate the ability of the speaker to understand sentences out of the meaning of the words which make up the sentence.

Raskin's essential puestion is: Does the word possess meaning in isolation or acquire meaning only in the sentence? – or, in expanded form: Does the sentence possess meaning in isolation or acquire meaning only in relationship to the surrounding explicit/implicit discourse?

Earlier, I referred to Raskin's definition of <u>script</u>; in this vien each word of a sentence is characterized by a limited domain of a continuous semantic graph that exists within the mind. Every word in the lexicon taps this domain, and the most <u>adjacent nodes</u> (the meanings most regularly associated with a particular word) are evoked more strongly than the less adjacent nodes. This type of lexical analysis has been criticized (see Planalp) as a process without end, but Raskin feels that this still should not prevent an analyst from trying to get as far as possible into one's knowledge of this domain as one can. He feels that the limits of the "evocation process" are determined by the purpose of the semantic analysis and other potentially evocable information is disregarded. In verbal jokes, ambiguity or ambiguous words are the center of two or more domains of the continuous semantic graph, and combinatorial rules function to combine scripts evoked by words into

one or more compatible combinations. If there are no clues to deciphering the ambiguity, combinatorial rules introduce Grice's <u>bona-fide</u> <u>communication mode</u> (no lying, acting, jokes etc,), It is at this point that Raskin introduces his <u>semantic theory of humor</u>, again, space limits a detailed discussion of Raskin's ideas, however, I would like to introduce his Main Hypothesis:

- "(1) A text can be characterized as a single-joke-carrying text if both of the conditions of (2) are satisfied.
- (2) (i) The text is compatible, fully or in part, with two different scripts. (ii): The two scripts with which the text is compatible are opposite in a special sense (this special sense is, in general, a 'real' situation evoking an 'unreal' situation which has three basic types of opposition - 1) actual situation/non-actual, nonexisting situation 2) normal, expected state of affairs/ abnormal, unexpected state of affairs 3) possible, plausible situation/fully or partially implausible or much less plausible situation — and an extra dimension of script oppositeness, which is the evocation of dual categories essential to human life true/false, good/bad, death/life, obscene/not obscene, money or little money). The two scripts with which the text is compatible are said to overlap fully or in part on this text. According to (1), therefore, the set of two conditions in (2) is proposed as the necessary and sufficient conditions for a text to be funny." (emphases Raskin's) (pg.99)

Influenced by Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP) and Maxims, Raskin defines joke-telling as <u>non-bona-fide communication</u>, and parallel to

Grice's, Raskin's Maxims on which a CP for a non-bona-fide communication mode of joke-telling are:

- 1) Give exactly as much information as necessary for the joke.
- 2) Say only what is compatible with the world of the joke.
- 3) Say only what is relevant to the joke.
- 4) Tell the joke efficiently.

In a situation in with both S and H are attuned to humor and to each other, both aware that they are in a joke-telling mode of communication, it is clear that a CP is involved. Joke-telling occurs in four different situations created by the combination of the two possibilities in (3) with the two possibilities in (4):

- (3) (i): The speaker makes the joke unintentionally.
  - (ii): The speaker makes the joke intenionally.
- (4) (i): The hearer does not expect a joke.
  - (ii): The hearer expects a joke.

In the ideal situation – (3) (ii) – (4) (ii) – H does not expect S to tell the truth or convey relevant information and understands S's intention as an attempt to make H laugh — H looks for the necessary ingredients of the joke in S's utterance. According to Raskin's Main Hypothesis, these include two overlapping and opposite scripts. Raskin's premise is that if H establishes that S has violated the CP for bona – fide communication, H's next step is — at least in an American context — to assume that H is engaged in humor (You're joking!).

Naturally, Raskin goes into much greater detail in his book to explain and to give examples to illustrate his theory. I would like now to deal with Raskin's chapter on ethnic humor – more specifically, with what he calls <u>non–standard specific scripts in ethnic jokes</u> — Jewish humor and the specific script of ANTI – SEMITISM. In the Appendices to this essay I give a streamlined analysis of a sample joke — a complete scene from Woddy Allen's ANNIE HALL. Here I would like to summarize what Raskin and other writers have to say about ethnic humor.

Ethnic humor is based on a number of specific scripts and oppositions which must be internalized by speakers and hearers of ethnic jokes. Such scripts incorporate world knowledge and must be acquired separately from linguistic competence. These scripts are stereotypes which are only crude reflections of the 'real' world. Ethnic scripts are conventional, fictional, and mythological (pg.180). They are also simplistic and schematic - they involve oppositions or pairs of simplistically opposed scripts. The basic type of script oppositeness used in ethnic humor is possible/impossible rather than normal/abnormal, and the essential feature Raskin sees most often used is good/bad; thus, most ethnic humor functions as disparagement or deprecation. (An interesting point Raskin makes about ethnic humor is that if the NS does not realize that these scripts are simplistic and schematic and do not reflect reality accurately, then the NS's reality coincides with the scripts and is mythological in nature (p.193) This is often the case with prejudiced Ss and Hs). In most cases, the conventional nature of the scripts is clear to S (and H), and scripts are used consciously and have to be "acquired as a special mythological kind of encyclopedic information" (pg.194). As Sherzer (1985) notes:

"...inter-ethnic jokes-like all jokes-involve an intense condensation of multiple presupposed meanings as well as a certain degree of ambiguity of interpretation." (215)

This ambiguity can often be interchanged among different ethnic groups so that it is possible to hear the same joke rephrased as a Polish joke, an Italian joke, a Sikh joke, or a 'Newfy' joke. I am particularly interested in less universal ethnic joke scripts, the ethnic scripts that exist between two ethnic groups – in the case of this essay, between the Jews and the Germans. It is the non–interchangability — the availability or unavailability of certain ethnic scripts — of this type of ethnic humor that relies on restricted knowledge scripts and which can seem so impenetrable to the uniniated. Raskin writes that ethnic scripts are not part of a NS's semantic competence; they are what he terms "pseudo-encyclopedic" scripts, and ethnic humor depends wholly on these scripts which are part of the world knowledge of the NS (pg. 207).

Jewish humor is often seen as self – disparaging — especially in those cases where the ethnic scripts are the same scripts used in anti – semitic jokes by other ethnic groups. But as Raskin points out, what is special about Jewish humor originating with Jews is the existence of a very extensive array of scripts not available to other ethnic groups. The most important script is that of ANTI – SEMITISM, and the extreme expression of ANTI – SEMITISM is the HOLOCAUST, which also has its own script.

Since jokes involve relating unstated assumptions to the stated they are in many ways tests and displays of intelligence and knowledge. We view jokes as speech play and verbal gymnastics, but jokes are also aggressive — the audience is often forced to display knowledge or lack of knowledge about a certain area — by catching the punch—line and laughing, or not catching the punch—line and being made to look and act like the straight—man. (Raskin has a very good introductory chapter on the history of how some of the greatest minds in western civilization have viewed humor.) As Nash writes, to understand the broadest humor one must be broadly informed (pg. 4); however in the case of the ethnic humor of Woody Allen, one, one must be very specifically informed.

As stated earlier, Raskin calls jokes "the perfect symbols of schema in discourse" (pg.54), and they are interesting windows on how the mind and society interact with each other.

The S's and H's knowledge of the language they share, gives them access to certain scripts in the form of an internalized lexicon of their mother tongue, and experience — especially shared experience — narrows these scripts to an even narrower subset of scripts. (I should reemphasize that Raskin writes only about NS-NS situations, and writes with an ideal S and H in mind, l.e., those that share the same scripts and whose sense of humor is identical. The acquisition of this shared knowledge and access to shared scripts seems to me to occur at the same time that one acquires linguistic knowledge; it is quite possible for a non – NS to become extremely proficient in the Second language (L 2), but I doubt that humor that must access scripts below the broadest level can ever be accessible to the non – NS until a great

deal of cultural knowledge about the L2 — culture has been internalized.

Joke-telling and humor in general seems to me to be an extremely interesting area in which discourse analysis can offer a great deal of insight. As a foreign language teacher I can see how very important it is that L 2 students learn to recognize when humor is intended. It does not seem to me that Raskin's semantic theory of humor has much applicability to the EFL/ESL teaching situation, but I found it an extremely interesting exploration into how NSs go about tapping the meanings hidden within sentences and discourses. Raskin's script-based analysis of verbal humor provides a logical basis for various intuitions many writers have about humor and an easy to understand explanation of the ability to produce and understand jokes.

#### APPENDIX A

#### Annie Hall

Scene: Exterior - Manhattan - Street - Day
Alvy (Woody Allen) and his best - friend Rob (Tony Roberts)
are deep in conversathion:

- 1 Alvy: I distinctly heard it. He muttered under his breath
- 2 "Jew".
- 3 Rob: You're crazy!

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4	Alvy:	No, I'm not. We were walking off the tennis court, and
5		you know, he was there and me and his wife, and he
6		looked at her and they both looked at me, and under
7		his breath he said, "Jew".
		engang Politica strucket kenjero Systematica
8	Rob:	Alvy, you're a total paranoid.
9	Alvy:	Wh····· How am I a paran····· ? Well, I pick up on those
10		kind o' things. You know, I was having lunch with
11		some guys from NBC, so I said uh, 'Did you eat
12		yet or what?' and Tom Christie said,'No, didchoo?'
13	**	Not,did you, didchoo eat? Jew? No, not did you eat,
14		but jew eat? Jew. You get it? Jew eat?
		and the second of the second of the second
15	Rob:	(······) ···you see conspiracies in
16		everything.
17	Alvy:	No I don't! You know, I was in a record store. Listen
18		to this - so I know there's this big, tall, blond,
19		crew - cutted guy and he's lookin' at me in a funny
20		way and smiling, and he 's saying, 'Yes, we have a
21		sale this week on Wagner.' Max. (sic), Wagner -
22		so I know what he's really tryin' to tell me very

significantly, Wagner.

23

## APPENDIX B

# Analysis of Verbal Joke

I am really only interested in the main joke as it unfolds in lines 17-23 Appendix A. The joke is created by an overlap of two opposed scripts which I have labelled CLERK/NAZI. It is not very difficult to discover this script as the 'paranoid' Alvy - character has made four references to the word JEW in lines 1-14 and also repeated the pun on "did you"/"Jew" four times. The main joke is conventionally framed with the discourse marker "Listen to this....." in lines 17-18 which is a very common signal that a joke is about to be told. Another discoursal marker, which Stubbs (1983) calls an "existential proposition" (pg.204) is also a common and recognizable way of starting a story or joke ".....there's this....." in line 18 (Once upon a time there was ..... There were these three guys ..... There was an old lady from.....). Also, on an extra - lexical/ - linguistic level, those of us with the Restricted Knowledge Script that Woody Allen is a comedian, a Jewish comedian, a Jewish comedian who is often neurotically self absorbed about his Jewishness, a neurotically self - absorbed Jewish comedian who is often 'paranoid' about being Jewish in a world controlled by non-Jews — we are primed for laughter by Woddy Allen's appearance in any scene and we tentatively access JEWISH HUMOR scripts. The opposition between the real and unreal situation evoked by the text belongs to the plausible/much less plausible situation. The unreal situation is conjectured by the paranoid Alvy - character. A certain distance exists between the two opposed scripts because they are neither negations nor plausibly compatible conjunctions of each other. They involve a life / death dichotomy.

According to Raskin's script analysis, every word of a sentence or clause evokes one or more scripts. I have listed each word from lines 17-23 Appendix A in Appendix C and arranged them in similar outline to a model joke analysis found in Raskin (pg.118-120). I have listed the scripts evoked by the text of the joke, clause by clause using The American College Dictionary. The scripts considered unmarked (linguistically) are underlined. Raskin's combinatorial rules start out by calculating the meaning of the phrase and of the sentence on the basis of syntactic structure and the scripts in 1-6 Appendix C, and within each clause the rules will look for the script (s) which are evoked by two or more words. So in the first clause the rules will notice the common script PLACE denoted as spatial in 1,ii, (3) (WAS) and situation in 1,iii, (2) (IN) and shop and warehouse in 1,vi, (1)–(3)(STORE). The rules consequently shift unmarkedness from being equal or belong to a set in 1,ii,(1) (WAS) to spatial in 1,ii, (3) (WAS) and adopt PLACE as a working hypothesis. Therefore the rules will then reject supplies, esteem, and great quantity in 1, vi, (2), (3)—(5) (STORE) as not being easily matched with the script PLACE. These choices will then lead, with some additional syntactical information available within the continuous semantic graph mentioned earlier in the main body of the essay, to the selection of phonographic in 1.v, (5) (RECORD) as the best choice among the nine scripts of (RECORD). Both the shop and warehouse scripts for (STORE) will be recognized

as appropriate (though warehouse less so) fillings for the adjacency node. Finally the unmarked script for <u>indefiniteness</u> in 1,iv, (1) (A) will be accepted in favor of <u>singularity</u> in 1,iv,(2) (A) because the combinatorial rules will accommodate the fact that (STORE) is being mentioned for the first time and since unmarkedness is always preferred over markedness, will select <u>indefiniteness</u> over <u>singularity</u>. Consequently, the first clause of the joke will be understood as ambiguous in two ways:

- (1) STATEMENT: The subject of this clause was spatially situated in a PLACE designated as an unspecified phonographic shop.
- (2) STATEMENT: The subject of this clause was spatially situated in a <u>PLACE</u> designated as an unspecified phonographic warehouse.

And so on until all 6 clauses of the joke are analyzed. One important element of information that Raskin says combinatorial rules are intersted in from the start of any discourse is the mode of communication, and the usual path is to believe that one is in a bona–fide communication mode. However, there have already been hints that this is a non – bona–fide communication mode ("did you'/"Jew" pun) and the discoursal markers ("Listen to this....."/"......there's this....."). Raskin's analysis of his sample joke is extremely detailed (he also chose, on purpose, an easily explicated joke) – I will refrain from any further analysis at this level.

What triggers the joke in lines 17-23 Appendix A is that for a bona – fide communication mode, the Alvy – character gives us what appears to completely superfluous information — Why mention that the record

store clerk was big, blond and crew-cutted? — this breaks the CP Maxims of :

- 1) QUANTITY give as much information as is needed
- 2) RELEVANCE say things that are relevant (to the 'real' situation)
- 3) MANNER-say things clearly and briefly

Therefore this communication mode is most likely not bona - fide communication (or if it is, from the viewpoint of S, then something is very odd), hints have been strewn throughout previous discourse either the Alvy-character is joking, lying, crazy (and many other possibilities). Combinatorial rules will then start looking for a competing script analysis of the entire text in view of the Main Hypothesis. Another clue will be to look for a potentially opposed script. This we can easily find because we have previous discourse hints at an ANTI-SEMITISM script. We also have the triggering device of WAGNER (repeated three times lest we miss the point). Our Restricted World Knowledge Script tells us how particularly signifcant Wagner is for the Jews (he was German, rabidly anti – semitic, Hitler's favorite composer, the composer of a Nazi party anthem, the composer of music played at massive and frightening rallies, and the composer of music that is inaccurately associated with music played by inmate orchestras as the victims of the SS exterminations marched to their death in the gas chambers).

I have greatly simplified my semantic analysis because I chose a

rather difficult joke to analyze. As one of his steps Raskin says that the analysis requires a set of oppositeness instructions. I have done this in Appendx D and E. In Appendix E I tried to chart the way I envision the mind jumping around a sentence and coming across words which evoke so many different domains. In Appendix D I have supplied a rather detailed list of synonyms and antonyms. Raskin's oppositeness list is rather compact, and using his list typology I have tried to explicate the Woody Allen joke in this manner:

If Script 1 is:

then Script 2 is:

(1) real

unreal

(2) plausible

much less plausible

(3) goodness—related

badness related

(4) life-related

death-related

(5) non-anti-semitic

anti-semitic

Raskin's last step (too complicated to go into here, but is, briefly, a strategy for a search for bona-fide, non-bona-fide communication modes and script appropriateness) then leads to a conclusion such as this:

Analysis of: Text (lines 17-23 Appendix A)

Result: joke

Script 1: Clerk

Script 2: Nazi

Type of oppositeness: Plausible / Much less plausible

Non-anti-semitic/Anti-semitic

This, in gist, is an example of Raskin's semantic script analysis of a verbal joke.

## APPENDIX C

- 1. i I pron. -(1)Nominative
  - ii -WAS = BE v. (1) Equal or belong to a set
    - (2) Exist
    - (3) Spatial
    - (4) Must
  - iii IN prep. -
- (1) Inclusion
- (2) Situation
- (3) Presence
- (4) Existence
- (5) Manner
- (6) Relation
- (7) Purpose
- (8) Direction
- iv A det. -
- (1) <u>Indefiniteness</u>
  - (2) Singularity
- v RECORD-adj. -(1) Written
  - (2) Aural
  - (3) Account
  - (4) Memorial.
  - (5) Phonographic

- (6) Notable
- (7) Highest
- (8) Evidential
- (9) Procedural
- vi-STORE-n.-
- (1) Shop
- (2) Supplies
- (3) Warehouse
- (4) Esteem
- (5) Great quantity
- 2. i -LISTEN-v.-
- (1) Give attention with ear
- (2) Heed
- ii -TO-prep.-
- (1) Position
- (2) Direction
- (3) Limit
- (4) Contact
- (5) Point in time
- (6) Aim
- (7) Destination
- (8) Result
- (9) Claim
- (10) Addition
- (11) Attachment
- (12) Comparison
- (13) Agreement
- (14) Relation
- (15) Infinitive verb accompaniment

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- (16) Transitive verb and indirect object connector
- (17) Intransitive verb/passive verb noun connector
- iii-THIS-pron.-
- (1) Thing/ (person) near
  - (2) Previously mentioned thing
  - (3) About to be mentioned thing
  - (4) Emphatic
  - (5) One of two thigs mentioned
    - (a) nearer
    - (b) opposition
- 3. i -SO-conj.-
- (1) Consequently
- (2) Under the condition that
- ii I pron. see 1. i(1)
- iii KNOW v. (1) Understand

  - (2) Memorize
  - (3) Be aware of
  - (4) Experience
  - (5) Distinguish
  - (6) Perceive
  - (7) Be informed
- iv-THERE-adv.-(1) Place-in/at
  - (2) Point in action
  - (3) Manner
  - (4) Place—to/into
  - (5) Call attention to

- (6) Interjection
- (7) ? coming before verb, as in, "there's no hope."

$$v - s = BE - v$$
. see 1.ii,(1)-(4)

vi-THIS-adv.-

(1) Extent

vii-BIG-adj.-

- (1) Large
- (2) Pregnant
- (3) Filled
- (4) Important
- (5) Haughty
- (6) Generous
- (7) Loud

- (2) Expense
- (3) Extravagance
- (4) Grandiloquence

(2) Having light-colored nair/skin

$$ix-GUY-n.-$$

- (1) Fellow
- (2) Person
- (3) Monster
- (4) Rope

$$xii - AND - conj. - (1)$$
 With

- (2) Besides
- (3) <u>Also</u>

- (4) As well as
- (5) To
- (6) Then
- xiii-HE-pron.- (1) Nominal
  - (a) Male
  - (b) That person

xiv-'S = BE-v.-see 1, ii, (1)-(4)

- xv-LOOK-v.- (1) Fix eyes on
  - (2) Glance in manner specified
  - (3) Search
  - (4) Tend
  - (5) Seem-appear
  - (6) Seem—to mind
  - (7) See-with mind
  - (8) Expect
  - (9) View
  - (10) Face
- xvi-AT-prep.- (1) Spatial
  - (2) Target
  - (3) Occupation
  - (4) State
  - (5) Cause
  - (6) Measure

xvii—ME—pron.— (1) Object

xviii-IN-prep.-see 1,iii,(1)-(8)

xix-A-det.-see 1, iv,(1)-(2)

# xx-FUNNY-adj.-(1) Amusing

- (2) Odd
- xxi-WAY-n.
- (1) Manner
- (2) Characteristic
- (3) Habitual manner
- (4) Particular
- (5) Direction
- (6) Passage
- (7) Distance
- (8) Path
- (9) Road
- (10) Route
- (11) Right of way
- (12) Line-of passage
- (13) Custom
- (14) Space for advancing
- (15) Procedure
- (16) Condition
- (17) Course of life
- (18) Business
- (19) Timber
- (20) Longitudinal strip
- (21) Movement water

 $x \times ii - AND - conj. - see 3, x ii, v, (1) - (6)$ 

xxiii-HE-pron.-see 3, xiii, (1) (a)-(b)

x x i x - S = BE - v - see 1, ii, (1) - (4)

- $x \times v SAY v.$  (1) Utter
  - (2) Speak
  - (3) Declare
  - (4) State
  - (5) Opinionate
  - (6) Recite
  - (7) Repeat
  - (8) Assume
  - (9) Allege
- xxvi-YES-adv.- (1) Affirmation
  - (2) Emphasis
- x xvii WE pron.
- (1) Nominative
  - (a) People-general
  - (b) Collective
- (2) Royal "I"
- x xviii—HAVE—v.— (1) Possession
  - (2) Contain
  - (3) Hold
  - (4) Receive
  - (5) Take
  - (6) Required
  - (7) Experience
  - (8) To hold in mind
  - (9) Exhibit action
  - (10) Maintain
  - (11) Understand

- (12) Birth
- (13) Wear
- (14) Disadvantage
- (15) Outwit

x xix - A - det. - see 1, iv.(1) - (2)

xxx-SALE-n.- (1) Act of selling

- (2) Quantity sold
- (3) Demand
- (4) Reduced disposal
- (5) Transfer or property

x xxi - THIS - adj. - see 2, iii, (1) - (5)

x xx ii - WEEK - n. (1) Seven days

- (2) Working part of seven days

x xxiii - ON - prep. -(1) Above

- (2) Proximity
- (3) Situation
- (4) Place
- (5) Support
- (6) Course
- (7) State
- (8) Basis
- (9) Liability
- (10) Occasion
- (11) Direction
- (12) Encounter
- (13) Object of thought/action/desire

## (14) Reference

xxxiv-WAGNER-n.-(1) German composer (1813-1883)

- 4. i WAGNER n. see 3, x xxiv, (1)
  - ii MAX n. (1) Man's name
  - iii WAGNER n. see 3, x xxiv, (1)
- 5. i SO conj. see 3, x xxiv, (1)
  - ii I pron. see 1, i, (1)
  - iii KNOW v. see 3, iii, (1) (7)
  - iv-WHAT-adv.- (1) Extent
    - (2) Manner
    - (3) Respect
    - (4) Reason
  - v HE pron. see 3, xiii, (1) (a) (b)
  - vi S = BE v. see 1, ii, (1) (4)
  - vii-REALLY-adv.-(1) Actually
    - (2) Truly
    - (3) Genuinely
    - (4) Indeed
  - viii TRY v. -
- (1) Attempt
- (2) Test
- (3) Experiment
- (4) Open
- (5) Examine—judicially
- (6) Strain
- (7) Afflict
- (8) Melt

- (9) Extract
- (10) Refine

ix - TO - prep. - see 2, i, (1) - (17)

x - TELL - v. -

- (1) Narrate
- (2) Make known
- (3) Proclaim
- (4) Utter
- (5) Divulge
- (6) Say plainly
- (7) Discern
- (8) Distinguish
- (9) Inform
- (10) Assure—emphatically
- (11) Command
- (12) Mention, one after another another

x i - ME - pron. - see 3, x viii, (1)

- 6. i -VERY-adv.- (1) High degree

  - (2) Extremely
  - (3) (intensifier)
  - (4) Identical
  - (5) Even
  - (6) Mere
  - (7) Sheer
  - (8) Actual
  - (9) True sense of the term

#### 言葉あそびにおける意味論的文字の分析

## (10) Genuine

## (11) Legitimate

# ii — SIGNIFICANTLY—ady. —(1) Importantly

- (2) Indicative of
- (3) Suggestive

iii - WAGNER - n. - see 3, x xxiv, (1)

## APPENDIX D

BIG SMALL insignificant extreme excess lack dwarfish monstrous violent pacific cruel ineffectual frightening mousy dreadful feeble horrible neutralgigantic stunted superior inferior superman lumpen underman overman subordination supremacy excess lack higher lower blessed deficient

#### ピーター・ミックダナ

weak strong impotent virile masculine effeminacy bloodless flush tremble pulse enfeebled engorged manly unmanly powerless powerful decayed potent Lilliputian Gargantuan wretched blessed slight muscular SHORT giant pygmy colossus midget towering cringing hover grovel. shadow overhang inferior superior overlord prostrate stand crouch higher lower above beneath BLOND **SWARTHY** Asiatic/Latin/Jewish Nordic

TALL

Germanic

Jewish/Latin/Asiatic

#### 言葉あそびにおける意味論的文字の分析

Jewish/Slavic/Asiatic "Aryan" cold hot dark light mongrel pure evil good Semitic Germanic life death dirty clean mongrel pure depraved moral high low spiritual base blessed damned angelic diabolic defiled pure antiseptic contaminated

CREW-CUTTED

potent

thoroughbred

LONG-HAIRED

potent (?)

mongrel

clean dirty
pure depraved

neat unkempt

potent effete

physical mental

body mind

## ピーター・ミックダナ

military intelligentsia strong weak mighty powerless death ideas murder creation brutish sensitive heartless mindfull mind (?) inhuman bloodshed ideas mindless all mind victimizer victim tormentor tormented molester molested wounder wounded maimer maimed persecutor persecuted torturer tortured crucfier crucified maltreater maltreated assailant afflicted sadism masochism sadism pain victory grief exult misery blessedness wretchedness exult despair

#### 言葉あそびにおける意味論的文字の分析

sadism agony
murder martyrdom
paean lament
survival doomed

blessed accursed

triumphant crushed

athlete intellectual

physical mental strong weak

mighty powerless

overpowering insignificant

overwhelming underwhelming (?)

male female/effete/hoosexual

virile impotent brutish refined

right-wing left-wing

fascist communist

Nazi Slav/Jew/Gypsy

# WAGNER MAHLER(?)/MENDELSSOHN(?)/VERDI(?)

drama calm

emotion intellect(?)

German Italian (light) (dark)

(blond) (swarthy)

(etc.)

#### ピーター・ミックダナ

serious decadent (?)

heavy light

operatic (unoperatic (?))

overblown understated

Teutonic Christian/Jewish/Civilized(?)

Germanic Latin/Slavic/Jewish/Asiatic

Anti-semitic Jew

Hitler Jew

Nazi Jew

Holocaust Jew

death camp Jew/Gypsy/Slav

concentration camp Jew/Gypsy/Slav

Auschwitz Jew

annilation Jew

extermination Jew

bestiality martyrdom

sadism horror

sadism suffering

victimize victim

hell release from suffering

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
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
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Script A

Script B



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