# FREEDOM
## A Buddhist Critique

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You have only to consider yourself free to feel yourself bound;
You have only to consider yourself bound to feel free. (Goethe)

The growth of freedom has been the central theme of history, Lord Acton believed, because it represents God's plan for humanity. One does not need such a Whiggish view of history to notice that the history of the West, at least, has indeed been a story of the development of freedom. We trace the origins of Western civilization back to the Greek "emancipation" of reason from myth. Since the Renaissance, there has been a progressive emphasis, first on religious freedom (the Reformation), then political freedom (the English, American, French revolutions), followed by economic freedom (the class struggle), colonial and racial freedom (independence movements and civil rights), and most recently sexual and psychological freedom (feminism and gay rights emancipate women and sexual "deviance"; psychotherapy frees us from neuroses). Today deconstruction and other postmodern intellectual developments free us from authorial intention and the strictures of the text itself--what might be called "textual liberation".

So it is no surprise that freedom today is the paramount value of the Western world, and through the West's influence it is becoming that of the rest of the world as well. Yet the history of freedom itself contains enough contradictions to make us pause. As important as the Renaissance was for the development of personal freedom, we also see in it the roots of the problems that haunt us today; in particular, the extreme individualism that liberated greed as the engine of economic development and that continues to rationalize the destruction of community bonds. The French, Russian and Chinese revolutions resulted in Napoleon, Stalin and Mao, respectively, vindicating Burke's warnings about the sudden disintegration of even oppressive political authority. And today technological freedom to transform the natural world is causing such despoilation that we are in danger of destroying ourselves as well....If freedom is our supreme value, then, it is a problematic one. This paper will explore that problematic from a Buddhist perspective. I shall argue that making freedom into our paramount value is dangerous. Freedom conceived in secular, humanistic terms is fatally flawed, because it does not and cannot

give us what we seek from it.

Central to Buddhist teachings is a denial of the self (an-atman). Our dissatisfaction with life derives from a repression even more immediate than death-fear: the suspicion that "I" am not real. For Buddhism, the ego is not a self-existing consciousness but a mental construction, a fragile sense-of-self dreading its own no-thing-ness. Our problem arises because this conditioned consciousness wants to ground itself -- i.e., to make itself real. If the sense-of-self is a construct, however, it can real-ize itself only by objectifying itself in the world. The ego-self is this never-ending project to objectify oneself in some way, something consciousness can no more do than a hand can grasp itself or an eye see itself.

The consequence of this perpetual failure is that the sense-of-self has, as its inescapable shadow, a sense-of-lack, which it always tries to escape. What Freud called "the return of the repressed" in the distorted form of a symptom shows us how to link this basic yet hopeless project with the symbolic ways we try to make ourselves real in the world. We experience this deep sense of lack as the feeling that "there is something wrong with me," yet that feeling manifests, and we respond to it, in many different ways: I'm not rich enough, not published enough, not loved enough, etc. Such anxiety is eager to objectify into fear of something, because we have particular ways to defend ourselves against particular feared things. The problem with objectifications, however, is that no object can ever satisfy if it's not really an object we want.

In this way Buddhism shifts our focus from sexual wishes (Freud) and the terror of future annihilation (existential psychology) to the anguish of a groundlessness experienced here and now. The Buddhist solution to the sense-of-self's sense-of-lack is simple although not easy. If it is no-thing-ness I am afraid of (i.e., the repressed suspicion that, rather than being autonomous and self-existent, the "I" is a construct), the best way to resolve that fear is to confront what has been denied: i.e., to accept my no-thing-ness by becoming no-thing. Meditation is learning how to become nothing by learning to forget one's self, which happens when I become absorbed into my meditation-exercise. Consciousness unlearns trying to grasp itself, objectify itself, real-ize itself. For Buddhism, then, the only genuine solution is a "spiritual" one -- that is, one which addresses the root problem by my "letting go" of myself in order to realize my interrelatededness with all things.[1]

If this Buddhist persective is vaid, it has two very important implications for the way we view freedom. First, any culture that emphasizes the individuality of the self will inevitably come to place paramount value on the freedom of that self. Freedom is usually defined as self-determination, and etymology (de + terminus, to limit, set boundaries) reveals its connotations of separation, of establishing boundaries between the self and the not-self. Hence is not surprising that from its very beginning the Western history of free-

dom has been strongly associated with the development of the self, or, to put it another way, with subject-object dualism. Insofar as freedom is understood as freedom from external control, a discrimination is implied between internal (that which wants to be free) and external (what one is freed from). This is important because what has been called the "stillbirth" of freedom outside the West is related to the fact that non-Western societies have had different conceptions of the self and its relationship with the other.

The second implication, and my main working hypothesis, is that if the self-existence and autonomy of that sense-of-self is an illusion, as Buddhism claims, then such a self will never be able to experience itself as enough of a self -- in particular, it will never feel free enough. It will try to resolve its lack by expanding the sphere of its freedom, which, however, can never become wide enough to be comfortable.

We shall see that this relationship between the self and its freedom explains much about the curious development of Western freedom and perhaps a great deal about our predicament today.

## I

To understand the West in context we must begin with what existed before the West. Recent historical studies have emphasized that the value placed on freedom was generated out of its opposite, the "social death" of slavery. Since slavery was so common, however, this by itself does not go very far to explain why social freedom developed only in the West.[2] The basic problem is that among nonslaves the presence of slaves reinforced their sense of group solidarity and participation; and what the slave desired was never freedom in our evolved Western sense (which would have been fatal, since there was no place for a "free" person in such societies) but reduced marginality and partial resocialization into the master's community.

This already shows something important about the relationship between the individual self and its valuation of freedom: there is no social context for esteeming freedom until there is a social role for the individual to function as an individual. Dynastic Egypt provides a good example of this. As Max Weber noticed, the "prevailing rule would be 'no man without a master,' for the man without a protector was helpless. Hence the entire population of Egypt was organized in a hierarchy of clientages." For Weber this reveals "the essential characteristic of a liturgy-state: every individual is bound to the function assigned to him within the social system, and therefore every individual is in principle unfree."[3]

This principle applied to the pharaohs as well, for although they were gods even gods had their role to play in maintaining the cosmic order. That is why every attempt of the pharaohs to free themselves from the power of the priests was thwarted. When everyone is fixated within a divinely-sanctioned hierarchy (we are also reminded of the Indian caste system), there is no social space for personal freedom because the social structure has no place for self-directed individuals. Just as important is the implication for what

Orlando Patterson calls "sovereignal freedom", the power to do utterly as one pleased with another person.[4] In spite of the authoritarian nature of most human societies, such sovereignal freedom did not normally exist, because all social relationships existed within a network of countervailing powers (including divine powers that limited human hubris). This points to one of the tragic paradoxes that have dogged the history of the West: personal freedom and totalitarianism are not opposites but brothers, sons of the same father, for the historical conditions that made democracy possible also made totalitarianism possible. The self-directed individual could evolve only by the destruction or weakening of the "hierarchy of clientages" or (in more tribal societies, including pre-Cleisthenes Athens) of kin-based lineages; yet the authority-vacuum that creates can just as well be manipulated by those in a position to seize absolute political power no longer limited by countervailing social forces.

This point may be made another way: the breakdown of hierarchies and lineages allows for the development of more autonomous, self-directed individuals, but it also allows for the creation of "the masses". That brings out another disturbing aspect of this paradox: the eagerness with which plebs repeatedly embrace their autocratic rulers. If (as the sense-of-self's sense-of lack implies) freedom makes us anxious, the more free we are the more anxious we will be, and the greater our need to resolve that anxiety one way or another -- usually by surrendering it to some authority figure or father protector.

Yet there is another "solution" to this dialectic, or an opposite temptation: the members of a society may decide instead that they are not yet free enough, that they must struggle further to become truly free. Unfortunately, this approach threatens to become a vicious circle because it denies us any solace in community bonds, insofar as we never can feel free enough. To express it in terms of our sense-of-lack, today one of our main ways to objectify our lack is by feeling that we are not yet as free as we deserve to be. This is not to deny that there are always many human wrongs which need to be human righted, but this does give us some insight into, e.g., the popularity of victimhood in the United States. Victimhood is learning how to address the problem of one's life by discovering how one is being exploited or has been abused; then one's anger and self-pity become justified and socially acceptable. From a Buddhist point of view, however, this is dangerous, since rather than pointing the way to overcome one's sense of lack it reinforces one's delusive sense of self, as that which has been abused.

For the masses totalitarianism is a temptation to surrender our freedom, yet the sense-of-self's sense-of-lack helps us understand this authoritarianism from the autocratic side. Another way to try to resolve one's sense of lack is by extending control over others. If the self is groundless and therefore naturally anxious, it can try to defend itself and gain control over some ground by seeking to dominate what is outside it. If, again, no amount of control can allay the insecurity that haunts the self, this search for control also tends to become demonic, which explains much of the tragedy of human history. Stalin never felt secure enough because it is not possible to feel secure enough.

The need to surrender our freedom by submitting to an authority figure therefore meshes all too comfortably with the anxiety that drives tyrants to keep trying to totalize their power. They evolved together at the expense of those countervailing social forces that traditionally limited the exercise of such concentrated power as much as the exercise of personal freedom.

## II

> The many basic terms [the Greeks] contributed to our lexicon -- history, physics, geometry, geography, logic, theology, ethics, politics, aesthetics, etc. -- testify to the literally extraordinary range of their thought.
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> There remains a significant exception: the Greeks did not develop a higher religion.[5]

On the contrary: the Greeks developed the higher religion of the self -- i.e., humanism -- and they also discovered that that religion doesn't work. The Greco-Roman experiment with secular humanism failed, not for extraneous historical reasons but because it self-destructed. Its distinctive contribution to the development of freedom (and the individual self) survived only as sublated in the Augustinian synthesis of Neoplatonic thought with Christian theology, which could cope with the greater anxiety of greater inwardness only by postulating an original sin (due to Adam's misuse of freedom) that would be resolved only in the afterlife.

In "discovering" the eternal psyche that persists unchanged, early Greek thought also discovered the idea of eternal substance (Thales' water, Heraclitus' fire, etc.). That which was believed to persist unchanged (the psyche) sought that which was believed to persist unchanged (Being). Beginning with Parmenides, only that which is permanent can be grasped by genuine knowledge, for comprehending transient things provides only a semblance of knowledge. From a Buddhist point of view, however, the knowledge that the Greeks sought was from the beginning a delusion, the glorious but vain quest of a constructed individual to ground itself by discovering the Ground of all things.

In setting up reason as the method whereby this psyche and this Being may be discovered, the Greek thinkers opened a door to what proved to be a blind alley. Despite its other fruits, rationality, the science of thinking, does not provide a handle to grasp and resolve the sense-of-self's sense of lack. The new religions of the self which tried to do so, such as Epicureanism and Stoicism, eventually reached a dead end in the speculations of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Yet Neoplatonic emphasis on subjective inwardness survived in the Augustinian emphasis on the self's essential sinfulness. Sin required constant watchfulness and introspection, thus deepening the self's introversion, and it provided that self with a way to understand and cope with the deeper sense of lack shadowing it. Faith that lack will be overcome (initially, in the return of Christ and the heaven that would inaugurate) generated a future-orientation which would continue long after

that faith had yielded to more secular hopes and preoccupations.

Complex cultural conditions encouraged the development of Greek humanism. The exposure to many defferent foreign cultures and customs encouraged skepticism towards their own myths. Thales founded natural philsophy when he did not use gods to explain the world. Unilke Moses, Solon did not get his tables from them when he gave Athens new laws. Greek drama reduced the gods' role by emphasizing human motivation and responsibility. Socrates used the gods to rationalize his mode of inquiry, yet his quest for wisdom did not otherwise depend upon them.

We do not escape the gods so easily, however. Psychologically they serve a crucial function. We ground ourselves in a mythological worldview because it organizes the cosmos for us: it explains who we are, why we are here, and what we should be doing with our lives. In the process, mythologies usually explain what our lack really is and how it can be resolved. If their vision becomes too fanciful or constrictive, its disappearance is likely to be worse, because that not only liberates the self, it also liberates my lack. And that points to the problem with Greek humanism and rationalism as an alternative: it did not and could not work insofar as it did not show the sense-of-self how to resolve its sense-of-lack; instead, the increased individuality of the Greeks aggravated their lack.

This helps us to understand what we now know about the "harmonious Greeks": that they were not Apollonian but profoundly anxious and troubled, "an unusually energetic, restless, turbulent people, given to excess", who idealized harmony and balance because it was a virtue they rarely achieved. As Thucydides noticed, they "were born into the world to take no rest themselves, and to give none to others."[6] The Homeric mythology had offered no hopes of a heavenly afterlife. Death is not even the peace of sleep, for everyone ends up in Hades. It was an inauspicious origin for Greek humanism, and it got worse, as there was "an undeniable growth of anxiety and dread in the evolution of Greek religion"[7], which is what one would expect if stronger sense-of-self means stronger sense-of-lack.

> [T]he individualism of the Greeks was more likely to become reckless and lawless, or simply selfish, because it was neither sanctioned nor disciplined by an explicit democratic or religious principle. It was rooted in the Homeric tradition of personal fame and glory and was nourished by habitual competition, as much in art and athletics as in business, but everywhere off the battlefield with little team play....the individualism was tempered by little sense of strictly moral responsibility, or in particular of altruism...[8]

The sad truth is that the Athenian democracy we laud today did nothing to enhance the justice of that society or its relations with other societies. Most progressive thinkers were tried for heresy: Anaxagoras, Diagoras, Socrates, probably Protagoras and Euripides; later Plato and Aristotle wisely absented themselves. No one suggested liberating

the slaves or emancipating women. When Athens became democratic, it became, if anything, more imperialistic and genocidal, as the Peloponnesian War amply demonstrates, which is to say that collectively the Athenians' impulses towards greed and domination were not at all improved by the fact that they had evolved a new mode of self-governance.[9]

Such criticisms tend to be anachronistic: we should not criticize the Athenians for not living up to democratic principles that they were just begining to develop. Nevertheless, the problems mentioned above are precisely the sort to be expected if the increase in self-consciousness were shadowed by an equivalent increase in anxiety, i.e. lack. When this lack--the feeling that "something is wrong with me"--is not resolved in a sacred world-view which answers my doubts with a faith that grounds me in the cosmos, I shall try to ground myself in more individualistic, self-ish ways.

How did the more thoughtful members of Athenian society react to these developments? We do not know how much Plato's political views were colored by Socrates' trial and execution, yet there is no doubt about his dislike of democracy, which he dismissed as "an agreeable, anarchic form of society, with plenty of variety, which treats all men as equal whether they are equal or not". The basic weaknesses of democracy are mob rule, demagoguery, and a tendency towards anarchy, since the mass of people grow impudent from "a reckless excess of liberty". The main concern of The Republic is the problems with city-state democracy; it addresses the root of the problem by analyzing the democratic personality, which lacks a coherent organizing principle and therefore follows the strongest pressures of the moment--a recipe for internal strife.[10] Aristotle is almost as critical of the democracies in which he lived, for "in these extreme democracies, each man lives as he likes--or, as Euripides says, 'For any end he chances to desire'".[11] He prefers a mixed constitution combining the best of oligarchy and democracy, with a more "bourgeois" bias than Plato's ideal state.

These elitist views were a response to changing social realities. If the fifth century was one of civic freedom, the fourth century (which began with Socrates' execution) increasingly became one of individual freedom and self-indulgence as the integrity of the polis declined in favor of the personal advancement which came to preoccupy those who controlled economic life and many of those who controlled political affairs. Demosthenes lamented that politics had become the path to riches, for individuals no longer place the state before themselves but view the state as a way to promote their own personal wealth. It would become a familiar complaint.

The consequences of this for Greek thought were profound. The philosophical discourse on freedom took a radical turn: a critical distinction was made between outer and inner freedom. In the context of the philosophical inquiry that primary for Socrates and his successors--a search for the Truth about the human soul and human society--democracy had failed; but instead of freedom being renounced it came to be redefined. The Republic makes a momentous analogy between harmony in the state and harmony in the

soul. Internalizing the Greek scociological understanding of freedom and slavery as requiring each other, Plato came to conceive of reason as the master (hence the free party) with desire and emotion as its slaves. The virtue of freedom was retained by reconceptualizing it in terms of the self-mastery of self-consciousness. In contrast to the incoherent life of the democrat, the psychic tendencies of the spiritually developed individual are governed by reason and in that way harmonized with each other.[12] Like the merchants and politicians who retreated into the more private world of their own self-advancement, those who succeeded Plato retreated from committment to the polis into the more private world of abstract thought, which for them became the only method by which true freedom may be gained.

Restated in terms of lack: the democratic experiment in self-government had not worked to resolve the increased anxiety that the increased individualism of the "democratic personality" generated, for the self-governance of the demos clearly did not entail the self-governance of the self. Just as the sophists had realized that the state is a construction that can be reconstructed, so those after Socrates realized that the psyche is a construction that can be reconstructed, with reason as the master. And the aggravated sense of lack that shadowed increased individualism required such psychic reconstruction.

Needless to say, that reconstruction did not appeal to many. This meant that new gods besides reason would have to be found. In the early Hellenistic age the cult of Tyche ("Luck" or "Fortune") became wisely diffused; in the second century B.C. astrology suddenly became popular; in the first century B.C. people became increasingly preccupied with occult means for individual salvation. Dodds' conclusion is hard to dispute: "once before a civilised people rode to the jump--rode to it and refused it."[13] The great experiment of Greek rationalism, as a humanistic alternative to religion and superstition, had failed.

In retrospect, the fateful Platonic move was equating freedom with reason and understanding psychic reconstruction in terms of the domination of reason. The immediate philosophical heirs to this were Cynicism, Epicureanism and Stoicism, which developed into religions of the self, stradding between more conventional religions and philosophy as we know it today, the search for propositional truth. In place of salvation through ecstatic mysteries they offered a salvation to be gained from rational self-cultivation, but they are just as much religions insofar as they are designed to cope with the personal lack caused, as they now understood it, by the self's desires and passions. Their ultimate goal was autarkeia, inner freedom from negative emotions and their entanglements. The aim of their theorizing was to contribute to the development of such states of tranquillity, which they equated with autarkeia.

And just how lack-free was the self-controlled individual? Marcus Aurelius always held the deepest reverence for Epictetus, but when Epictetus, after one of his discourses on "the road which leads to freedom", was asked point-blank if he himself were truly free, he had to admit that while he wanted and prayed to be so, he was still "not able to look

into the face of masters." Yet he could point to someone who is, or was: Diogenes the Cynic, who had died over four hundred years earlier! Evidently none of the Stoic masters had achieved it.[14]

By both the philosophical and the conventional standards of his time, Marcus the Roman emperor should have been one of the freest men who ever lived; what his Meditations unwittingly reveal, then, is how little such freedom meant, both his sovereignal dominion and the reason-able freedom developed by his self-control. With him the Stoic tradition culminates in the realization that such freedoms do not bring personal fulfilment or peace of mind. In my Buddhist terms, they cannot resolve one's sense-of-lack.

The increased introversion entailed by psychic reconstruction enlarged the sphere of one's subjectivity, but identifying that freedom with reason provided no way to cope with the increased sense of lack shadowing it. Freedom understood in such secular terms proved to be unsuccessful.

The stage was set for return to a more explicitly religious perspective: the Augustinian discovery/construction of sin. If even the internal freedom of dominant reason does not satisfy, but freedom still remains one's ultimate value, then there must be yet another, even more internaized kind of freedom...

## III

To understand the failure of classical humanism is to appreciate the importance of Augustine, who salvaged the inwardness of its enhanced subjectivity and bequeathed it to the Western tradition that developed after him and out of him. He was able to recuperate and revitalize this interiority of self-presence because he added a new element, or perspective: the awareness of sin, and particularly the incorrigibility of orginal sin.

Sin provided precisely what the classical Greco-Roman tradition lacked, a way to understand and cope with the sense of lack that shadows the groundless sense-of-self. Human beings have been dislocated by an ancient Fall. Now I know what is wrong with me: I have sinned. And now I know what must be done: atone for my sins (including that of our father, Adam) and strive to sin no more in the future. The classical emphasis on reason is replaced by the primacy of will, a faculty unknown to the Greeks; the problem of reason, error, is superceded by the problem of will, which is sin. The rigorous self-examination and neverending watchfulness that required encouraged an ever-deepening inwardness well exemplified in Augustine's own Confessions.

Yet there is an important difference between the Christian understanding of sin and my Buddhist understanding of lack, and their identification was a fateful confusion. Belief in sin does not actually show the way to resolve lack; rather, one's anxiety is short-circuited by the belief that one's lack will (or can be) alleviated in the future. For the first Christians this would happen at the Second Coming, which had been imminent but by Augustine's time was becoming attenuated into a more generalized preoccupation with the future.

Augustine played a crucial role in this development. With his conversion to Christianity he brought Neoplatonic free will with him: man is the author of his own degradation. Yet postulating an original sin made this degradation more foundational and difficult to cope with, as he himself soon discovered. The extraordinary book ten of the Confessions "is not the affirmation of a cured man; it is the self-portrait of a convalescent."[15] But the convalescent never fully recovered. What became distinctive in Augustine's religious attitude was "a sharp note of unrelieved anxiety about himself and a dependence upon his god."[16] The later sermons and letters reflect his terrible realization

> that he is doomed to remain incomplete in his present existence, that what he wished for most ardently would never be more than a hope, postponed to the final resolution of all tensions, far beyond this life....All a man could do was to 'yearn' for this absent perfection, to feel its loss intensely, to pine for it.[17]

For Augustine, then, true freedom could only culminate a long process of healing--a process so difficult that we cannot expect it to conclude during our lifetime. As Peter Brown adds, this marked "the end of a long-established classical ideal of perfection."[18] But if perfection is not attainable in this world, it must be postulated as attainable somewhere else: there must be another world, after death, in which our lack can be resolved. The stage was set for the success of the medieval church; as God's agent on earth it gained a monopoly on the future dispensation of lack.

This was a complex, many-sided legacy. Sin offered a way--indeed, developed a spiritual technology--to cope with lack, but the increasing subjectivity it promoted also deepened the sense of lack that needed to be coped with, as the example of Augustine himself shows. According to how it was handled, sin could liberate you from considerable anxiety or enmesh you more tightly in labyrinths of self-doubt and self-hatred. Understood metaphorically, the doctrine of original sin contained at its core an invaluable grain of liberating truth: our sense of lack is the price of our individuality and freedom; my lack teaches me that I am not self-present but conditioned by something that it is my spiritual responsibility to dis-cover. Understood more literally, original sin enslaves my incipient freedom to those religious institutions that claim to control its dispensation. Yet the radical inward turn Augustine encouraged, by seeking God within, opened the door for the genuine spiritual freedom of the great Christian mystics, such as St. Francis and Eckhart, who discovered what according to Buddhism is the only true way to resolve our lack: liberation from self in nondual union with something greater than the self, a loss of self-preoccupation which can lead to identifying oneself with all creation--not only with the needy and sick, but with Brother Sun and Sister Moon.

## IV

And what does all this mean for our lack today? For all the problems with sin, at least it taught a way to cope with the feeling that "something is wrong with me". Today, although our sense of self (and therefore our sense of lack) is stronger than ever, and

although our subjective alienation from the objectified world is greater than ever, we no longer believe in sin. Therefore we lack an effective, socially-agreed way to understand and deal with our lack--which means that it tends to manifest in individualistic ways that further weaken community bonds and relationships.

Suddenly, however, we find ourselves in a radically different situation which is beginning to transform our valuation of freedom. Like it or not, our paramount value must be reexamined from a new perspective. The ecological degradation of the earth, which is already damaging our own well-being and perhaps threatens our own survival, has superceded other problems. This situation cannot be understood in terms of, or solved by, our need for greater freedom. On the contrary, freedom in this case is the problem, insofar as the human species has attempted to enlarge the sphere of its own "sovereignal" freedom by reshaping the whole earth into its own image. The environmental crisis is running up against the basic paramenters of Western civilization, which has viewed progress in freedom as the solution to everything. As many have emphasized, what we need today is not a Declaration of Independence but a Declaration of Interdependence, which tempers our understanding of freedom by emphasizing that the quest for "complete" freedom is a delusion too dangerous to tolerate anymore.

## NOTES

1. For more on this, see David Loy, Lack and Transcendence: death and life in psychotherapy, existentialism and buddhism (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996).
2. This does not mean that slavery was an integral part of many social economies. According to M.I.Finley (Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology [New York: Viking Press, 1980], p.9), there have been only two genuine slave societies outside the Americas, classical Greece and classical Italy. This carries the awkward implication that the world's first democracy generated the world's first slave economy, for the slave economy of Athens was a consequence of Solon's reforms which gave political and economic rights to the demos. The loss of such an important source of involuntary labor was compensated by the decision to import large numbers of slaves from outside Athens, a solution welcomed by the demos. This explains the Greek understanding of freedom and slavery as opposites that require each other.
3. Orlando Patterson, Freedom in the Western World (New York: Basic Books, 1991), pp.36,37.
4. Ibid.,p.3.
5. Herbert J.Muller, Freedom in the Ancient World (New York: Harper and Row, 1961).p.158.
6. History of the Peloponnesian War I.10. "Thucydides' History is the greatest text ever written on the powerful, ultimately self-destructive, impulses toward greed and domination... Ironically, in his obsessive attempt to prove how rationally the Athenians could behave in the jungle world of international politics, he demonstrates just how mad they were." (Freedom in the Western World,p.364)
7. See E.R.Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951),p.44. "In discarding the Inherited Conglomerate [traditional worldview], many people discarded with it the

religious restraints that had held human egotism on the leash. To men of strong moral principle--a Protagoras or a Democritus--that did not matter: their conscience was adult enough to stand up without props. It was otherwise with most of their pupils. To them, the liberation of the individual meant an unlimited freedom of self-assertion; it meant rights without duties, unless self-assertion is a duty" (Ibid.,p.191).

8. Freedom in the Western World, p.218.
9. See Eil Sagan, The Honey and the Hemlock: Democracy and Paranoia in Ancient Athens and Modern America (New York: Basic Books, 1991), ch.11 and passim.
10. Plato, The Republic 565d, 701b, 561 c-d.
11. Politics 1310a, in Aristotle, Politics, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958).
12. The Republic 431.
13. The Greeks and the Irrational, p.254. "I have already suggested that behind the acceptance of astral determinism there lay, among other things, the fear of freedom--the unconscious flight from the heavy burden of individual choice which an open society lays upon its members (p.252).
14. Discourses 4.1.128-131.
15. Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p.177.
16. Ibid.p.123.
17. Ibid.p.156.
18. Ibid.p.156.